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Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics, by J.P. Moreland & 
Scott B. Rae. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000. Pp.384. $22.99. 
BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Augsburg College 
It takes a lot of spunk to swim against the intellechwl tide; to do it well 
and convincingly takes serious intellectual work. The authors, an ethicist 
and a biblical scholar, demonstrate plenty of both in their spirited defense 
of Thomistic dualism. They are not alone in their anthropological assess-
ment; their company includes noted contemporary Christian philosophers 
like Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Taliaferro, and William 
Hasker, who espouse divergent types of dualism. But their view will not 
be popular in the current cultural milieu. 
The first chapter, which sets the stage for the rest of the discussion, estab-
lishes the approach the authors intend to take in addressing the issue of the 
human person. Rejecting the view that we should "'re-examine the claimed 
cognitive content of Christian theology in the light of the new knowledge 
derivable from the sciences'" (Peacock), the authors hold that "when it 
comes to addressing the nature of human persons, science is largely incom-
petent either to frame the correct questions or to provide answers" (40-1). 
Their method, following the Reformed theological model, is first to "formu-
late an adequate Christian world view, beginning with biblical teaching and 
the contours of church history, then to employ philosophy with a special 
emphasis on scriptural teaching, ... guided by common sense beliefs ... and 
our own first-person awareness of ourselves and our inner states" (44). 
"Philosophy," they conclude, "is autonomous from and more authoritative 
than science even in some areas that are properly within the domain of sci-
ence itself (e.g., the nature of time, space, causation, consciousness, the per-
son)." Finally, "ethical knowledge [is] a source of information for adjusting 
the ontological model when appropriate and relevant" (46). 
Thus, as expected, the opening chapter contains their fundamental theo-
logical and biblical arguments. The philosophical argument goes: "God is 
the paradigm case (i.e., clearest example) of a person, and arguably angels 
are as well.. .. God is an immaterial reality, most likely an immaterial sub-
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stance ... Angels are immaterial beings .... Anytrung is a person if and only 
if it bears a relevant similarity to the paradigm cases.... The relevant simi-
larity ... is grounded in something all persons have in common, namely, 
personhood. Personhood is constituted by a set of ultimate capacities of 
thought, [etc.].... None of these ultimate capacities is physical, and there-
fore neither is personhood itself .... Human persons qua persons are [there-
fore] immaterial substances and not material ones" (24-5). The argument 
from the biblical text is a much shortened and less nuanced version of the 
able defense given by John Cooper (Body, Soul and Life Everlasting, 1989). 
In the succeeding chapters the authors contrast their Thomistic substance 
dualism with the view that persons are property-things. In chapter two 
they develop an extensive metaphysical primer, complete with the use of 
modal logic (hardly expected in a book from InterVarsity Press). The dis-
cussion is careful, informative, and helpful, though some suggested impli-
cations might be problematic. For example, in the discussion of the 
Aristotelian view of substance, we are informed that a severed hand is not a 
human hand but "merely a heap of atoms and other parts" (71). But why is 
not a severed hand a substance? Would it be one if we were trying to reat-
tach it? - "Please prepare the human hand in the cooler, not the simian 
one." The mere fact that something is lmsustainable in its current condition 
seems irrelevant to establishing what are substances. Is a potted but not an 
uprooted plant a substance? Would the body, as a corpse, cease to be a 
humall body (substance)? 
The authors suggest several difficulties with the naturalist view. For one 
thing, naturalists cannot hold "to an emergent supervenient view of mental 
states and properties," in part because "there is neither need nor room for 
anything else" (101). Neither can naturalists account for "absolute personal 
identity at and through time." Thirdly, naturalists are incapable of account-
ing for a libertarian concept of free agency. In place of a property-thing 
view, the authors argue for substance dualism and the existence of a soul. 
Several arguments are advanced. First, "the various properties and states 
that constitute the conscious lives of human persons are immaterial mental 
properties and states. Moreover, these mental properties are kind-identify-
ing properties; they tell us about the kind of thing that has them. Therefore, 
human persons are at least immaterial, mental kinds of things" (158). The 
authors stress the "intrinsic, subjective, inner, private, qualitative feel" of 
first-person reports and the role of intentionality to substantiate their view 
of mental properties. Second, they appeal to "Christian theology, common 
sense and various philosophical arguments ... to affirm that persons sustain 
a primitive, absolute unity of the self at a time and absolute, real sameness 
through various kinds of change," (170), something, it may be recalled, for 
which the view that persons are property-things cannot account. The third 
argument, whose dubiousness is conceivable and possible, is based on the 
contention that the conceivability and possibility of substance dualism pro-
vides good grounds for thinking that the view is true. 
The authors make clear they are not contending for a Cartesian but a 
Thomist form of dualism, where the soul is the form or individuated essence 
of the body, diffused throughout and "fully present in every body part" 
(201). The soul makes it a human body, employing biochemical processes 
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lias it teleologically tmfolds its capacities toward the formation of a mature 
human body that functions as it ought to function by nature" (202). In this 
the authors adopt the natural law theory, with its doctrine of essences and 
the four causes. This brings one to the old chestnuts of how the body and 
soul relate and how the soul is transn"litted. As for the first, we are told that 
the soul "has direct, immediate conscious awareness through the body ... 
and [that] it can directly and immediately will to move the various parts of 
the body" (202). Directing the development of the body, the soul "takes 
parts within itself through nourishment, informs these parts with its own 
essence, and develops a spatial order or extended struchlre ... in order to 
realize other properties, functions or activities" (205). In effect, the physical 
parts and processes are tools of the soul. None of this, of course, has the 
slightest confirmation in science, but for the authors that is as it should be 
since it is a conclusion of theology and philosophy. As for the second, trans-
mission of the soul likewise is not a scientific but a theological subject. 
Application of it, however, leads to interesting speculation, especially when 
the traducian view is developed by suggesting that" any cell ... has these 
soulish potentialities" (304). In this regard, humans have empathy with 
starfish (their suggestion) or perhaps African violets, whose leaves and cells 
have soulish potentialities by virtue of their cloning capabilities (th.e authors 
don't discuss plant souls, though there must be such, given their view that 
anything alive requires a soul to direct it and give it identity). 
One peculiar argument arising out of their discussion is that organs 
themselves have a proper function. Accordingly, if an organ evolved from 
having one function to having another, "it would still be true to say that 
[that organ] ought to function" in the original way (208). Though widely 
espoused in the early 19th century, this view is scientific nonsense. What, 
for example, is the function of the flap on the ear? Its essence is - the 
authors might say it ought to - to collect sound. True enough, but in ele-
phants this function is overshadowed by the more significant function of 
being a thermal radiator. Or again, there is evidence that feathers, one of 
whose functions is to handle air in flight, evolved from epidermal scales, 
whose function is to insulate by trapping dead air next to the skin. Ought 
feathers to function differently than they do in flighted birds? 
Once one concludes that something cannot be alive without a soul and 
be a human person without a human soul, and that ensoulment occurs at 
conception, the particular applications of this doctrine to matters of med-
ical ethics having to do with life and death are fairly apparent. Abortion, 
use of reproductive technologies, and experimental applications, all that 
intentionally bring about the death of the fetus or embryos, are immoral 
because they unjustifiably destroy human persons. Indeed, women are 
morally obligated to undergo in utero fetal surgery to correct defects in the 
unborn because "the pregnant woman has a higher obligation to seek the 
best interests of her unborn child because that unborn child is totally 
dependent on the mother for its existence and nurture, and this depen-
dence heightens the obligation to care for the unborn child" (310). 
One issue that bears mentioning relates to end of life moral decisions. 
The authors consider four types of cases: physician-assisted suicide (PAS), 
patients in a persistent vegetative state (PV5), people in an eyes-closed 
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comatose state, and anencephalic infants. They critique the functional 
view of persons as applied to PAS on grounds reminiscent of earlier dis-
cussions. But beyond refuting four arguments given in favor of PAS, they 
never clearly argue for the wrongness of PAS. Presumably PAS is immoral 
because it involves the unjustified taking of a human life. With respect to 
the other three cases, they argue that although the individual in each case 
is fully a human person, "recognizing the personhood of the ... patient 
does not obligate one to offer all necessary treatments to keep such a 
patient alive." Withholding treatment is justified because the treatments 
are futile and, even if not, "may still be refused" (337). Included in unnec-
essary medical treatments are ventilation, nutrition, and hydration. 
Now why is PAS lll1justified whereas withholding medical treatment from 
PSV patients is moral? That is, what is the morally significant difference 
between PAS and withholding treatment, so that in the one case we are justi-
fied and in the other lll1justified in our actions? (We might employ "active 
euthanasia" and "passive euthanasia," though the authors never use these 
traditional terms.) Futility of treatment, insofar as it includes nutrition and 
hydration, does not constitute a morally significant difference, for the treat-
ments successfully keep persons alive. Karen Ann Quinlin and Nancy 
Cruzan survived for almost a decade with such assistance. Their futility must 
relate to the disease; that is, administering these treatments does not restore 
health. But the same can be said for those to whom PAS is administered: 
continuing assistance to maintain their lives is likewise futile; as terminally ill 
they eventually will die of their disease or its complications. Likewise, refusal 
as a manifestation of autonomy seems irrelevant to the distinction, since in 
cases of both PAS and PSV treatment might be refused or active euthanasia 
encouraged. The authors maintain that "autonomy [may bel limited when 
there is evidence of harm that results from the exercise of such autonomy." 
The harm suggested by allowing requests for PAS consists of "incidences of 
nonvoluntary euthanasia" (320), a result that may occur from PAS (or even 
PVS) policy decisions but hardly from granting individual autonomous 
requests. There is reason to think that the authors may suggest that the 
morally significant difference is to be fowld in that PSV patients die of their 
disease whereas PAS patients do not. But why should what one dies of con-
stitute a moral difference? The authors may want to appeal to allegedly dif-
fering motives, but it is not clear that the motives differ in the two types of 
cases. In both, the motive is not to extend the patient's misery and the dying 
process. Finally, they may want to appeal to the principle of double effect to 
differentiate the two cases, but their apparent rejection (341) of the oft-includ-
ed criterion that the bad effect not be the means to the good effect removes 
this from consideration. In short, it is difficult to see how the soul doctrine 
helps us with the difficult issue of active (PAS) vs. passive euthanasia. 
The authors have written a fine and useful philosophy book; it provides a 
strong, argumentative but readable philosophical defense of the immaterial 
soul and its ethical import in matters having to do with life and death. Its 
great shortcoming, from my perspective, is its almost tota I neglect of what sci-
ence contributes to the discussion. Indeed, science is largely excluded on the 
ground that deciphering the nature of human persons is strictly a philosophi-
cal matter. For example, this provides the basis for the authors' reply to the 
116 Faith and Philosophy 
thoughtful monist position of Nancey Murphy (Whatever Happened to the Soul, 
1998). Whereas Murphy considers her nonreductive physicalism as part of a 
scientific research program, the authors object that "this approach to the 
mind-body problem seems to be an expression of the low epistemic value 
usually attributed to theology by advocates of the complementarity 
approach" (168). For them, the weight of evidence clearly rests on theology 
and philosophy, and not science; "science provides little evidence at all for 
settling the issue" (170). Furthermore, where science is introduced in the 
book, it is basic and at times inaccurate. For example, biologists deservedly 
would be perplexed when informed that reproduction and growth "cannot 
be acc01mted for solely by the laws of chemistry and physics" (80). Or con-
sider the authors' contention "that DNA needs a driver." Quoting a noted 
French geneticist Francois Jacob that "'able to function only within the cell, 
the genetic message can do nothing by itself,'" they conclude that "he is 
describing something like a substance in which the DNA is an important part 
that needs instructions from some other part of the organism," which "leaves 
the door open for consideration of ... the soul" (296-7). Not only does this 
discussion of a driver for DNA mistake cause for context, but it confuses the 
very elements the authors have been at pains to distinguish elsewhere, i.e., 
the scientific and the metaphysical, for here they posit a metaphysical entity 
to perform biological tasks such as gene expression and determining how 
"'the cell senses danger and instigates responses to it'" (quoting geneticist 
Barbara McClintock). As my geneticist colleague commented, McClintock 
would rise out of her grave on hearing such an interpretation of her con-
tention that DNA needs a context in which to function. The welcome attempt 
to avoid genetic reductionism leads to serious misrepresentation of genetics 
and a type of philosophical soul-of-the-gaps. As a philosopher, I would be 
the last (well, almost) to denigrate the value of philosophy. But at the same 
time, philosophy must take account of the empirical. Science has greatly 
advanced our understanding not only of the human body with its brain, but 
of the human person expressed in its many features. We fail to integrate sci-
ence with our theology and philosophy at significant peril. 
Persons & Causes, by Timothy O'Connor. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Pp. xv, 125 plus References and Index. $35.00 (hardcover) 
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College 
Timothy O'Connor is one of the leading contemporary advocates of a lib-
ertarian view of freedom (free will or agency theory) that incorporates the 
concept of agent causation, and Persons & Causes is a first-rate presentation 
of this kind of libertarianism. It contains a defense of a version of a modal 
argument for incompatibilism (Chapter 1) and an examination of the agent 
causationist views of Thomas Reid, Richard Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm 
(Chapter 3). The principal aim of Persons ['1' Causes, however, is to explain 
why an adequate libertarianism must include agent causation. The main 
opponents of O'Connor are either (1) libertarians who affirm that agent cau-
